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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT
0. Thomas Johnson, Jr. *
THE term "alternative dispute resolution" is something of a misnomer
in the international context because it begs the question: Alternative
to what? The answer to this question is clear in the domestic context
where national courts provide a generally acceptable means of resolving dis-
putes whenever the parties cannot agree on some alternative means. In
many international disputes, however, resort to national courts is not possi-
ble absent consent of the parties, and where it is possible without consent at
least one of the parties will usually view it as a most undesirable option.
Thus, the only formal means of dispute resolution that find broad acceptance
in the international context are those created by agreement of the parties.
Three basic types of dispute-resolution mechanisms exist that are based on
the agreement of the parties: mediation, in which no report or decision is
issued; nonbinding arbitration, in which there is a decision but the parties
are not bound to comply with it; and binding arbitration. This article will
discuss the differences between these types of mechanisms in the specific con-
text of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which em-
ploys all three to handle different types of disputes. First, however, the
article will discuss the considerations that lead governments to employ par-
ticular dispute-settlement mechanisms in agreements like NAFTA.
I. WHY DO INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS HAVE
DISPUTE-SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS?
Long before ADR had become a term of art, or even a subject of any real
interest, international trade agreements were incorporating formal dispute-
settlement mechanisms. It did not, and does not, have to be this way, for
there is always the alternative of leaving trade disputes to be resolved
through informal negotiations, the means by which friendly countries re-
solve the vast majority of their disagreements. Moreover, this informal,
minimalist alternative leaves the parties free to submit any particular dispute
* Partner, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.; B.A. Stanford University, 1968;
J.D. Stanford Law School, 1971.
1. Signed at Washington by Canada, Mexico, and the United States, Dec. 17, 1992.
North American Free Trade Agreement (Westlaw, NAFTA 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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to arbitration or mediation whenever they might agree to do so. And noth-
ing in such a trade agreement would necessarily prevent the parties from
exercising their rights under international law to respond appropriately to
violations by other parties. 2
There are, however, good reasons why states incorporate formal dispute-
settlement procedures into trade agreements. The most obvious reason is the
desire of the parties to preserve the agreement and to promote its smooth
functioning. Without a formal dispute-settlement procedure, a party that
believes it has been wronged has only three options if it cannot persuade the
offending party to change its behavior: (1) it can do nothing; (2) it can retali-
ate pursuant to its rights under customary international law; or (3) the party
can withdraw from the agreement. 3 The disadvantages of doing nothing are
obvious. Retaliation entails the risk of counter-retaliation that might pro-
duce a destructive downward spiral of retaliatory acts. 4 And withdrawal
deprives the withdrawing party of the benefits of the agreement. Almost any
type of formal dispute-settlement mechanism improves the situation by de-
laying, if not preventing, the onset of retaliation and by providing an alterna-
tive to withdrawal or inaction.
Another, less obvious, difficulty with the minimalist approach to interna-
tional dispute settlement is that it leaves the post-agreement bargaining
power of the parties at pre-agreement levels. In any agreement, com-
promises are struck that reflect the different levels of bargaining power en-
joyed by each party. Without some formal dispute-settlement mechanism,
weaker parties justifiably fear that they will be at the same disadvantage in
any post-agreement dispute as they were in the original negotiations, and
thus might be denied the benefits of the original bargain. Canada and Mex-
ico no doubt labored under such fears in the NAFTA negotiations. 5
2. Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a material
breach of a multilateral treaty by one party entitles the other parties "to suspend the operation
of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either (i) in the relations between themselves
and the defaulting State, or (ii) as between all the parties." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, openedfor signature May 23, 1969, in 8 I.L.M. 679, 701. Although the United States
has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it is generally regarded as codifying customary interna-
tional law that governs international agreements. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) (the Vienna Convention is discussed
further at 144-45).
3. It is common for modern treaties, including trade agreements, to recognize a right to
withdraw on a stated period of notice. The NAFTA provides for such withdrawal on six
months notice. NAFTA Art. 2205. NAFTA's predecessor, the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement, contains an essentially identical provision (Article 2106). Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
4. For an excellent discussion of how a dispute-settlement mechanism can stop a retalia-
tory spiral in a trade dispute, see the discussion of the 1963 "chicken war" between the United
States and the European Economic Community ("EEC") in ABRAM CHAYES ET AL., INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE 249-306 (1968).
5. During the negotiation of the Canada-United States Agreement, Canada's Deputy At-
torney General, made the following comments on dispute settlement:
We have done pretty well [at resolving trade disputes] in the past, but there are
two reasons that I would advance have kept us from doing better. The first is
what I would call the level playing field reason. This reason recognizes that the
negotiating strengths of the two parties are not equal .... [M]echanisms to solve
disputes are vital to Canada. The existence of such mechanisms are going to
2176 [Vol. 46
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In any negotiation, the party with the most to give and the least to gain
will have the greatest bargaining power. 6 This describes the position of the
United States in the NAFTA negotiations. Although bilateral trade between
the United States and both Canada and Mexico is roughly in balance, this
does not mean that NAFTA is of equal importance to the three economies.
The U.S. economy is approximately ten times the size of Canada's and
twenty-five times the size of Mexico's.7 Thus, while the United States sells
as much to both Canada and Mexico as it buys from them, that trade is ten
times more important to Canada than it is to the United States, and twenty-
five times more important to Mexico. These differences in the relative eco-
nomic importance of the agreement mean that any given concession or retal-
iatory act will have an enormously greater impact on Canada or Mexico
than on the United States.8 This fact has been an important source of bar-
gaining power for the United States in the NAFTA negotiations. Without
some dispute-settlement mechanism, the United States will continue to have
substantially greater bargaining power in any post-agreement dispute.
Differences in bargaining power are also found in domestic disputes.
What distinguishes those disputes from international disputes, however, is
the existence of a dispute-settlement mechanism-the courts-resort to
which does not require the agreement of both parties. Thus, in negotiating a
resolution of a domestic dispute, both parties know that whatever their rela-
tive bargaining strengths might have been when their agreement was origi-
nally negotiated, their dispute ultimately can go to a court where those
strengths will be irrelevant. In most international disputes, there is no way
to prevent pre-agreement bargaining power from becoming post-agreement
bargaining power other than an agreed-upon means of settling disputes.
This need to neutralize a post-agreement imbalance in bargaining power is
make or break the issue in Canada. Quite apart from the substantive disagree-
ments, any agreement without a satisfactory dispute resolution mechanism will
not be acceptable. We cannot have a system that will see differences resolved on
the basis of raw power.
T. Bradbrooke Smith, Comments on Dispute Resolution Under a North American Free Trade
Agreement, 12 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 337, 337 (1987). Given the history of relations between the
United States and Mexico, and the vast difference in the sizes of the two economies, it would
be surprising if Mexican negotiators were any less concerned about U.S. power than was Mr.
Smith.
6. The party with the least to gain from a successful negotiation might also be described
as having the best alternative to a negotiated agreement, or "BATNA". See ROGER FISHER &
W. URY, GETTING TO YES, 99-111 (1981). The party with the least to gain, by definition, is
the party that sees the least difference between its BATNA and a negotiated agreement. Par-
ties with worse BATNA's need the agreement more and, therefore, are prepared to make
greater concessions to obtain an agreement than are parties with better BATNAs.
7. In 1989, the gross national product of the United States was $5.2 trillion. Canada's
GNP, by comparison, was only $530 billion, and Mexico's was $201 billion (all values in U.S.
dollars). GARY C. HUFBAUER AND J. SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (1992).
8. In absolute terms, the effects would be the same in each country. For example, if the
United States made a concession that cost it $10 billion in exports and increased Canada's
exports by $10 billion, that concession would have equal absolute costs and benefits. But the
negative impact of that concession on the United States, other things being equal, would repre-
sent only two tenths of one percent of U.S. GNP, while its favorable impact on Canada would
represent a full two percent of Canada's GNP.
1993] 2177
SMU LAW REVIEW
probably the most important reason why NAFTA contains a strong mecha-
nism for handling intergovernmental disputes.9
NAFTA also provides for mechanisms to handle certain disputes between
nationals of one party and the governments of the other parties.' 0 The rea-
son for these provisions, however, is not a concern over unequal bargaining
power. It is rather a concern over the impartiality of the domestic courts
that otherwise would be hearing the disputes. This is the same concern that
motivates virtually every arbitration clause written into an international
commercial contract.
Thus, at a very basic level, international trade agreements incorporate
agreed-upon dispute-resolution mechanisms for the same reason that domes-
tic antagonists resort to various types of ADR: fear of the default option.
The reasons for this fear, and the level of fear, are quite different, however.
Domestic parties generally worry about efficiency, not the impartiality of
domestic courts, and any concerns they may have about impartiality do not
approach those of international litigants with respect to foreign courts. Nor
are domestic parties faced with a default option in which they have no
choice but to negotiate away their differences in the face of unequal bargain-
ing power. It is thus no wonder that what are called Alternative Dispute
Resolution mechanisms domestically appear frequently in the international
context, for there they are usually the only alternative.
II. THE THREE BASIC TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE-
RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
As noted above, the three basic types of international dispute-resolution
mechanisms are: (1) mediation; (2) nonbinding arbitration; and (3) binding
arbitration. NAFTA employs all three types in one context or another.
A. MEDIATION
The basic attributes of a mediation procedure are: (1) a requirement that
the parties attempt to arrive at a negotiated resolution of their dispute, sub-
ject to a time limit that can be extended only by agreement; (2) an opportu-
nity for either party to refer the dispute to a mediator; and (3) a time limit on
the mediation process, extendable only by agreement of the parties, after
which the parties are free to pursue whatever other remedies are available to
them under international law, including appropriate retaliation.I
The primary shortcoming of mediation is that it does not really compen-
sate for differences in post-agreement negotiating power. A party can go
through the motions of a negotiation, ignore the efforts of a mediator, and, at
the end of the day, be in the same position it would have been in had there
9. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2005, 2007-08.
10. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1103-06 (concerning investment disputes); infra notes
32-37 and accompanying text. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1903-04 (concerning review of
antidumping and countervailing-duty determinations).
11. The parties would at all times retain whatever right they had under the agreement to
withdraw. Generally, this right is conditioned only on a specified notice period.
2178 [Vol. 46
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been no procedure at all. There is, on the other hand, the advantage that an
opportunity for mediated negotiations can increase the chances of reaching
an amicable settlement, at least if the parties are prepared to negotiate in
good faith. In addition, the time limits inherent in a conciliation procedure
restrict a party's ability to drag out negotiations in the hope of postponing
retaliation, thus creating an additional incentive to take both the dispute and
the negotiations seriously.
Mediation is generally not viewed as a sufficient dispute-resolution proce-
dure for a trade agreement since it does not neutralize differences in bargain-
ing power. It is often, however, the required first step of such a procedure.
This is true of the general dispute-resolution procedure set forth in Chapter
20 of NAFTA, which, as is explained more fully below, can result in the
referral of a dispute to nonbinding arbitration after all required mediation
procedures have failed. 12
Most often, the mediation provisions of trade agreements provide for
some sort of permanent commission composed of representatives of all the
parties to the agreement.1 3 Such commissions are usually given the tasks of
facilitating day-to-day communication among the parties and negotiations
concerning particular disputes. They may also act as mediators, or as the
bodies authorized to appoint mediators. 14
Chapter 20 of NAFTA establishes such a commission, the Free Trade
Commission, which is composed of cabinet-level representatives of each
party. The Commission is the heart of NAFTA's mediation process.
Among the Commission's duties are the supervision of the implementation
of the Agreement and the resolution of "disputes that may arise regarding its
interpretation or application."1I5 More specifically, Article 2007 of NAFTA
12. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2008, para. 1.
13. The United States' free trade agreements with both Israel and Canada provide for
such commissions. In both cases, the commission (the "Joint Committee" in the former agree-
ment; the "Canada-United States Trade Commission" in the latter) is composed of representa-
tives of the parties, with the principal representative of each party being the cabinet-level
officer with primary responsibility for international trade. Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 1802; Israel-United States Agreement on the Establishment of a
Free Trade Area, H.R. Doc. No. 61, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1985), art. 17, reprinted in 24
I.L.M. 653, 657 (1985).
14. E.g., Protocol Establishing the Final Mechanism for the Settlement of Disputes
Within the Latin American Free Trade Association, Chapter II, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 747, 748
(1968) (stating that the Standing Executive Committee is empowered to assist the parties to a
dispute in their negotiations but "may not express an opinion on the merits of the case in
dispute"); Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association, art.
35(m), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 672, 680-81 (1983) (explaining that the committee which acts as
the "permanent body of the Association" is empowered to "[p]ropose formulas for resolving"
disputes between parties concerning the principles of the agreement); Israel-United States
Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, H.R. Doc. No. 61, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 82 (1985), art. 19(1)(c), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 653, 665 (1985) (stating that either party
may refer a dispute to the "Joint Committee," which "shall endeavor to resolve the dispute");
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, supra note 3, art. 1805 (stating that the Com-
mission is empowered to appoint technical advisers or a mediator acceptable to both parties
"in an effort to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution" of any dispute referred to it by a
party).
15. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001.
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authorizes the Commission to call on technical advisers and to create work-
ing groups as it deems necessary, to engage in conciliation or mediation pro-
cedures, and to make such recommendations to the parties as it believes may
assist them in resolving their disputes. NAFTA puts mediation on a fast
track, however. If agreement is not reached within 30 days, the dispute may
be submitted to arbitration.
Four chapters of NAFTA provide for additional mediation procedures
that are unique to the subjects addressed in those chapters. In three of these
cases, the special mediation procedures-which include consultations with
specialized committees or working groups-substitute for part of the media-
tion process described in Article 20.16 In the remaining case (investment
disputes), the special procedure is nothing more than a requirement that the
parties attempt to negotiate a settlement before submitting the dispute to
arbitration, and it substitutes fully for the mediation procedure of Article
20.17 In all of these cases, either party may take the dispute to arbitration if
mediation is unsuccessful. 18
Thus, NAFTA makes rather full, and typical, use of mediation. While it
does not place sole reliance on mediation, NAFTA does find it to be a useful
first step in a process that includes arbitration. Indeed, with arbitration to
back it up, international mediation begins to look very much like domestic
mediation because, in either context, the parties know that the alternative to
mediation is another process in which differences in their bargaining power
will matter little.
B. NONBINDING ARBITRATION
The essential difference between mediation and nonbinding arbitration is
the role played by the third party. A mediator does not issue a report or
openly assign blame to one party or the other; an arbitrator does.19
Even though an arbitrator's report may not be viewed as binding, it radi-
cally alters the relative positions of the parties to the dispute. It does this by
stating who is right and who is wrong, thereby changing the question at
issue. With a report in hand, the question becomes not whether a particular
16. Id. arts. 513 (concerning customs procedures), 723 (concerning sanitary or phytosani-
tary measures), and 914 (concerning standards-related measures).
17. Id. arts. 1118-20.
18. This would be nonbinding arbitration under Chapter 20 for disputes involving Cus-
toms Procedures (ch. 5), Sanitary or Phytosanitary Measures (ch. 7, sec. B), and Standards-
Related Measures (ch. 9). Arbitration would be binding in the case of investment disputes
between a national of one NAFTA state and another NAFTA state (arts. 1118-20) and in
reviews of antidumping and countervailing-duty determinations pursuant to Chapter 19 (art.
1904, para. 9). See infra parts II. C. 1-2.
19. Not all authorities would accept the notion that non-binding arbitration is distinguish-
able from mediation. See Linda C. Reif, Conciliation as a Mechanism for the Resolution of
International Economic and Business Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 578, 601-06 (1991).
These authorities apparently view the binding or nonbinding nature of a decision as being all-
important, and categorize all proceedings resulting in a nonbinding decision as a form of medi-
ation. As explained in this section and following, this writer attaches critical importance to the
question of whether the third party does or does not assign blame and not to whether the
parties agree to be bound by the third party's decision.
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action violated the agreement but, if it did, whether the offending party takes
the agreement seriously. This raises the stakes in the dispute with no need of
threats from the innocent party. The offending party is thus simultaneously
permitted to modify its behavior without seeming to respond to threats and
at the same time given a far stronger reason for doing so facing the possibil-
ity of sanctioned retaliation.
Nonbinding arbitration is the mechanism chosen in NAFTA for resolving
virtually all intergovernmental disputes that cannot be resolved by media-
tion.20 NAFTA's arbitration procedures are modeled after the United
States' only other free trade agreements (with Canada and Israel) and pro-
vides a good example of nonbinding arbitration in the international-trade
context.
NAFTA arbitration panels are required to issue first an initial report and
then, following an opportunity for comment, a final report. 21 Nowhere,
however, do the parties agree to comply with a final arbitration report. In-
stead, they are given 30 days following issuance of the final report to arrive
at an agreed resolution of their dispute, "which normally shall conform with
the determinations and recommendations of the panel."' 22 When the parties
cannot agree on a resolution within 30 days of receiving the final report, the
complaining party is free to suspend performance of its obligations under the
Agreement to an extent that compensates for the benefits it has been denied
by the offending party "until such time as they have reached agreement on a
resolution of the dispute."'23 This is, of course, the same sanction that cus-
tomary international law would provide to the offended party even in the
absence of an arbitration procedure. 24
20. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 20. NAFTA carves out an exception for disputes over so-
called "emergency action," which may not be referred to arbitration under Chapter 20 but
may be referred to mediation. These emergency measures are unilateral protective measures
that parties are permitted to take if increased imports caused by implementation of the Agree-
ment result in substantial injury to an industry in the importing country. It is interesting that
disputes concerning emergency measures were accorded precisely the opposite treatment in the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which made them the only disputes under that agreement
that were subject to binding arbitration. Of course, if both parties agreed to do so, other
disputes could also be referred to binding arbitration. Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 11.
21. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2016-17.
22. Id. art. 2018.
23. Id. art. 2019. The free trade agreements between the United States and Israel and the
United States and Canada contain similar provisions. Article 19(2) of the Israel-United States
Agreement provides: "After a dispute has been referred to a panel and the panel has presented
its report the affected Party shall be entitled to take any appropriate measure." Article 1807,
paragraph 9 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement is more specific. It provides
that if the Commission does not achieve a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute
within 30 days of receiving the expert panel's report, and if a party "considers that its funda-
mental rights ... or benefits ... are or would be impaired by the implementation or mainte-
nance of the measure at issue, the Party shall be free to suspend the application to the other
Party of benefits of equivalent effect until such time as the Parties have reached agreement on a
resolution of the dispute."




Whenever a state enters into an international agreement, it surrenders a
certain measure of its sovereign freedom of action by committing itself to do,
or not to do, certain things. When that agreement provides for compulsory
binding arbitration of disputes, the state surrenders even more of its sover-
eign freedom. It is one thing to assume an obligation; it is something else to
be bound to comply with another's interpretation of that obligation. It is
this surrender of an additional measure of sovereignty that distinguishes
binding from nonbinding arbitration in the international context.
In practical terms, this distinction is more apparent than real. The es-
sence of nonbinding arbitration is the commitment of the parties to seek the
opinion of a third party as to who is right and who is wrong in any dispute
that they cannot otherwise resolve. Merely by committing themselves in ad-
vance to seek such opinions, the parties greatly limit their real ability to
ignore the opinions once they are issued. Moreover, as a basis for retalia-
tion, a nonbinding opinion is virtually the equivalent of a binding one, par-
ticularly when the agreement expressly authorizes retaliation in cases of
noncompliance. 25 Thus, it is the step from mediation to nonbinding arbitra-
tion that is the truly significant one.
If nonbinding arbitration goes far toward equalizing post-agreement nego-
tiating power, it is also true that binding arbitration goes at least somewhat
further in that direction. Thus, one might have expected Canada and Mex-
ico to insist on binding arbitration in order to further level the post-agree-
ment playing field. But when the stakes are high, the ability to continue a
contested practice without seeming to flout one's international obligations
may seem too valuable to surrender, even if retaliation by the aggrieved
party is certain. Canada, Mexico, and the United States all may have viewed
the stakes as being this high. On the other hand, these countries may simply
have recognized that, in an international-trade agreement, there is little dif-
ference between binding and nonbinding arbitration, particularly when retal-
iation is expressly permitted.
Although neither of the United States' other two free trade agreements
provides for comprehensive binding arbitration, most multilateral trade
agreements do. Indeed, many go so far as to create a permanent adjudicative
body of some sort. Examples include the European Economic Commu-
nity,26 the Andean Pact, 27 and the Latin American Free Trade Associa-
25. There is a school of thought - known as the "French view" within GATT circles -
that holds the obligations created by trade agreements are not to be absolute rules of behavior,
but rather standards, the violation of which is acceptable so long as appropriate compensation
is provided to the damaged party. In the words of one writer, "All ... [a trade obligation]
means is that you have topay for your sin. It does not mean that you cannot sin." Robert E.
Hudec, Dispute Resolution Under a North American Free Trade Area: The Importance of the
Domestic Legal Setting, 12 CANADA-U.S. L. J. 329, 331 (1987).
26. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), Jan. 1,
1958, arts. 169-77, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 75-77. The European Court of Justice issues binding
decisions not only with respect to disputes between member states, but also with respect to
disputes between member states and EEC administrative bodies. Id.
27. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, May 28, 1979, ch.
2182 [Vol. 46
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tion.28 The Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association
provides for nonbinding arbitration in much the same terms as does
NAFTA, but, unlike NAFTA, establishes a permanent adjudicative body.29
Whatever concerns the NAFTA parties may have had about binding arbi-
tration of disputes among themselves, they had no such concerns (or at least
overcame them) when it came to disputes between themselves and the na-
tionals of other parties. Two categories of such disputes, both of them very
important and contentious, are consigned to binding arbitration under
NAFTA: (1) investment disputes between a party and a national of another
party;30 and (2) disputes arising under the antidumping or countervailing
duty laws of one party that involve nationals of another party.31
1. Investment Disputes
At one time, few nations would have considered committing themselves to
submit disputes with foreign investors to binding arbitration. This situation
has gradually changed, however, as more and more states have found that
3, translation reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1203, 1206; Agreement on Andean Subregional Integra-
tion [hereinafter the "Cartagena Agreement"], May 26, 1969, ch. 2, translation reprinted in 8
I.L.M. 910, 911-16 (1969). Like the European Court of Justice, the Andean Group's Court is
empowered to decide not only disputes between member states, but also disputes between
member states and Andean Group administrative bodies. 18 I.L.M. at 1206. A dispute be-
tween member states concerning noncompliance with the Cartagena Agreement is initially
brought to the "Junta," which is the "technical organ" of the Cartagena Agreement, roughly
comparable to the EC Commission. Id. Following an investigation, the Junta presents its
written observations on the dispute to the member states concerned. Id. at 1207. Following an
opportunity for response by the member states, the Junta issues a "considered opinion." Id. If
a member state fails to comply with the Junta's opinion, the Junta must present the matter to
the Court. Id. The complaining member state also may bring the matter to the Court if the
Junta does not act in a timely fashion. 18 I.L.M. at 1207. If a member state fails to comply
with a decision of the Court within three months, the Court may authorize members to limit
or suspend "advantages deriving from the Cartagena Agreement which benefit the noncomply-
ing member country." Id.
28. Protocol Establishing the Final Mechanism for the Settlement of Disputes Within
LAFTA, Sept. 2, 1967, translation reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 747. The LAFTA dispute-settlement
procedure bears a striking resemblance to the procedures set forth in Chapter 20 of the
NAFTA (particularly the arbitration procedure) discussed in part III, infra. Under the
LAFTA procedure, disputes must first be referred to LAFTA's "Standing Executive Commit-
tee," which tries to bring the parties to a negotiated settlement. Id. at 748. If negotiations fail,
the parties may then invoke binding arbitration. Id. at 749. The parties to the dispute are
required to agree on three arbitrators from a pre-existing roster of persons already designated
by all the LAFTA parties as potential arbitrators. Id. at 751. Any arbitrators with respect to
whom agreement cannot be reached are selected from the roster according to a previously
established system of rotation. Id. at 752. "The award is compulsory for the Parties to the
dispute from the time notice of it is given, and it shall have the force of res judicata with
respect to the Parties." Id. at 916.
29. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, Jan. 4, 1960, arts. 31-
32, 370 U.N.T.S. 5, 22-23. The EFTA's Council, composed of representatives of each member
state, may refer any dispute that is before it to an "examining committee." Id. Such a refer-
ence must be made if requested by a concerned member state. Id. After considering the dis-
pute, including any report of an examining committee, the Council makes such
"recommendations" as it deems appropriate. Id. If a member state does not comply with the
Council's recommendations, the Council may then authorize any member state to suspend
such of its obligations to the offending member state as the Council considers appropriate. Id.
30. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11.
31. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 19.
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they are better able to attract foreign capital if they have entered into agree-
ments with capital-exporting countries. These agreements, usually called bi-
lateral investment treaties, almost always commit the parties to submit
investment disputes between one party and a national of the other party to
binding arbitration.3 2 The investment provisions of NAFTA amount to a
trilateral investment treaty among the three parties that includes such a cus-
tomary commitment to submit investment disputes to binding arbitration. 33
NAFTA's investment arbitration provisions are quite detailed, consuming
about half of the agreement's investment chapter and consisting of 23 arti-
cles.34 Some of this length is necessary to deal with relatively technical mat-
ters, such as: ensuring that investors of one party may submit claims even if
their investment is in an enterprise incorporated under the law of another
party (Articles 1116-17); ensuring that awards will be enforceable under the
New York Convention (Articles 1121-22, 1130)35; and providing for the
consolidation of claims that present common questions of law or fact (Arti-
cle 1126). More substantive provisions include: Article 1134, which em-
powers arbitration panels to order interim measures (not including
attachments); Article 1133, which permits panels to seek independent advice
from appropriate experts; and Articles 1123-24, which set forth the proce-
dure for appointing arbitrators in investment disputes. This appointing pro-
cedure is rather typical of what one finds in international arbitration
agreements. The parties are each required to appoint one arbitrator and to
attempt to agree on a presiding arbitrator. 36 The Secretary General of the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") is
empowered to appoint the presiding arbitrator if the parties do not reach
agreement, and to appoint other arbitrators if any of the parties fail to make
their separate appointments. 37
2. Review of Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty Determinations
Each of the NAFTA parties has domestic laws that prohibit the dumping
of imported products ("antidumping laws") as well as laws that provide for
the imposition of countervailing duties on subsidized imported products.
All of these laws remain in force under NAFTA, and each party retains the
right to enforce its laws and to amend them, subject to certain limitations.38
NAFrA, however, replaces judicial review of antidumping or counter-
32. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Turkey Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Dec. 3, 1985, art. 7, reprinted in
25 I.L.M. 87, 96-97.
33. The NAFTA's investment provisions are set forth in Chapter 11. Articles 1115-38 set
forth the procedures to be followed in an investment dispute. NAFTA supra note 1, art. 1115-
38.
34. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1115-38.
35. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, done at New York, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New
York Convention].
36. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1123.
37. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1124.
38. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1902.
2184 [Vol. 46
ADR AND NAFTA
vailing-duty determinations by national courts with review by binational
panels.39 These panels are charged with applying the law of the importing
country, including the standard of review that the appropriate court in that
country would apply.40 The procedure for appointing panelists is very simi-
lar to that set forth in Chapter 20 of NAFTA for appointing arbitrators for
other disputes between parties. Panels consist of five members, two ap-
pointed by each party to the dispute4' and a fifth to be appointed by agree-
ment of those parties. A roster of potential panelists is to be prepared in
advance by the parties, and it is expected that panelists will come from this
roster. There are also provisions to limit delay in the appointment of a panel
and to deal with situations where the parties are unable to agree on the fifth
panelist.42
NAFTA's provision for the nonjudicial review of antidumping and coun-
tervailing-duty determinations is probably the only dispute-resolution mech-
anism in NAFTA that can truly be viewed as a type of alternative dispute
resolution similar to that seen in the domestic context. First, and most im-
portantly, the binational review panels are an alternative to some other for-
mal means of dispute resolution that do not depend on the agreement of the
parties: i.e., the American, Canadian and Mexican courts that otherwise
would hear these appeals. That is not generally true of dispute-resolution
mechanisms in the international context. Moreover, the motivation for cre-
ating the binational panels was, in part, a concern over the impartiality of
the parties' national courts. This concern can be a contributing motivation
to a domestic ADR scheme. Indeed, the only real motivational difference
between NAFTA's binational panels and domestic ADR is the lack of any
real concern over efficiency on the part of the NAFTA parties.43
III. TYPES OF ARBITRAL BODIES AND THE PROCEDURES
FOR SELECTING THEIR MEMBERS
There are two fundamental types of international arbitral bodies: ad hoc
panels and permanent tribunals. Permanent tribunals have at least two sig-
nificant advantages over ad hoc panels. First, permanent tribunals are better
able than panels to develop a consistent jurisprudence over time. Such a
jurisprudence increases the clarity of the agreement and thus, at least in the-
ory, makes disputes less likely. In addition, a permanent tribunal makes it
unnecessary for the parties to appoint arbitrators every time there is a dis-
39. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1903.
40. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1904, 1911 and, Annex 1911.
41. In antidumping cases, the parties in the initial determination are the government of
the importing country and the specific foreign producers charged with dumping. These private
parties do not appoint panelists, however. All members of Chapter 19 binational panels are
appointed by the involved governments. NAFTA, supra note I, Annex 1901.2.
42. Id.
43. Chapter 19 of the NAFTA was closely modeled after the antidumping and counter-
vailing-duty review procedures contained in the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement.
These procedures were adopted in the Canada-United States negotiations as a last-minute
compromise when the parties were unable to agree on a provision that would have restricted
their ability to apply their antidumping and countervailing-duty laws to each other.
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pute, a process which can itself become a source of friction and which often
results in the selection of particular arbitrators more because of their known
support for a position than because of their reputations for ability and
fairness.
The NAFTA parties, however, chose not to provide for a permanent tri-
bunal. There are at least two reasons that might explain this decision. First,
it is hardly clear that such a tribunal would have enough work to justify its
existence. The arbitration procedure established under the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement has been used five times since that agreement came
into force in 1988, and it is unclear why one should expect substantially
greater demand for arbitral panels under NAFTA.44
In addition, the principal advantage of a permanent tribunal-its superior
ability to develop a consistent jurisprudence-can also be seen as a disadvan-
tage. An ad hoc panel hears but one dispute and is then dissolved; its poten-
tial for doing mischief is therefore limited. A permanent tribunal, on the
other hand, could potentially hear many disputes before any change was
made in its membership, and even then its membership would change only
gradually. The damage that could be done by an uncongenial tribunal is
therefore substantial. It would not be surprising if all three of the NAFTA
parties thought that the advantages of such a tribunal did not justify the risk
that it might prove to be both long-lived and unfriendly.
In the end, the NAFTA parties agreed upon a procedure that avoids the
risks inherent in a permanent tribunal and also avoids some of the problems
that can arise when parties try to agree on arbitrators for particular disputes.
If mediation is unsuccessful, a dispute is referred to a five-member arbitral
panel. 45 The members of the panel come from a roster of up to 30 individu-
als selected in advance by consensus of the parties.46 Each disputing party is
required to name two panelists who are citizens of the other party. 47 The
chairman of the panel is to be selected by agreement of the parties, but if that
fails, one of the disputing parties, selected by lot, will select a chairman who
is not a citizen of that party. 48 If any party fails to name its panelists within
the time specified, those panelists are to be selected by lot from that group of
44. In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Her-
ring, Final Report of the Panel CDA-89-1807-01 (Oct. 16, 1989); Lobsters from Canada, Final
Report of the Panel USA-89-1807-01 (May 25, 1990); Treatment of Non-Mortgage Interest
Under Article 304, Final Report of the Panel USA-92-1 807-01 (June 8, 1992); The Interpreta-
tion of and Canada's Compliance with Article 701.3 with Respect to Durum Wheat Sales,
Final Report of the Panel CDA-92-1807-01 (Feb. 8, 1993); Puerto Rico Regulations on the
Import, Distribution and Sale of UHT Milk from Quebec, Final Report of the Panel USA-93-
1807-01 (June 3, 1993).
45. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2008, 20011.
46. Id. art. 2009.
47. Id. art. 2011.
48. Id. Where there are two parties complaining against the third party, the selection
procedures are similar. The panel still has five members, the party complained against must
appoint two panelists who are citizens of different complaining parties, the complaining parties
must jointly appoint two panelists who are citizens of the party complained against, and the
chairman is to be selected by agreement, failing which one side of the dispute (chosen by lot)




roster members who are citizens of the other party.49
Most procedures for appointing ad hoc arbitral panels permit the parties
to appoint virtually anyone as an arbitrator; there is no list of arbitrators
designated in advance. Otherwise, they are not very dissimilar from the ap-
pointment procedures set forth in Chapter 20 of NAFTA. Thus, under most
ad hoc arbitration schemes, the parties must first try to agree on a panel or
on a sole arbitrator; if they cannot, they each appoint a member of the panel,
and those members attempt to agree on a third member (the chairman); if
agreement cannot be reached on the third arbitrator, the parties look to an
appointing authority, designated in the arbitration agreement, who appoints
the third member. 50
While such procedures are quite workable, they present one important
difficulty: Arbitrators appointed at the sole discretion of one party will often
be appointed because their views on an important question are known and
favor the appointing party. When this happens, a party-appointed arbitrator
can end up acting more as an advocate than as a judge. Strictly speaking, an
arbitrator appointed because of his views on a particular question does not
violate his obligation of independence either by accepting the appointment
or by acting consistently with those views in the arbitration. 51 Whenever a
party makes such an appointment, however, the obligation of independence
is violated in spirit because the appointing party has, in effect, "packed the
court," and done so after being put on notice of precisely what the important
questions in the arbitration will be.5 2
49. Id. art. 2011.
50. In the case of agreements calling for a sole arbitrator, the appointing authority will be
called upon once the time allowed for the parties to agree on a designation has expired. In the
case of five-member panels, each party will appoint two members, who will then try to agree
on a fifth member. See, e.g., Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law, arts. 5-8 [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules]; International Chamber of Com-
merce, Rules of Arbitration, arts. 3-6 (1988).
51. The obligation of international arbitrators to be independent of the parties that ap-
point them is clear. For example, the International Bar Association's "Ethics for International
Arbitration" (reprinted in 2 INT'L ARE. REP. 287 (1987)) takes the position that international
arbitrators should be "impartial, independent, competent, diligent and discreet" and makes no
distinction between party-appointed arbitrators and chairmen or sole arbitrators. Similarly,
both the ICC Rules (Article 7) and the UNCITRAL Rules (Articles 9-10) expressly require
independence of all arbitrators operating under those rules. Finally, Article 2009, Paragraph
2, of the NAFTA requires that all arbitrators "be independent of, and not be affiliated with or
take instructions from, any Party .... " NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2009.
It is also clear that this obligation of independence does not preclude the appointment of
arbitrators who have prior views on questions at issue in the arbitration. W. Lawrence Craig,
et. al., International Commercial Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AR-
BITRATION BOOKLET 4, 210-12 (1990). Nor does it prevent parties from trying to learn what
those views are from sources other than the arbitrator. There are widely accepted limitations
on the subjects that an appointing party can appropriately discuss with an individual being
considered for appointment as an arbitrator. Coombe, The Selection and Conduct of the Party-
Appointed Arbitrator: International and Domestic Ethical Considerations, 1 Newsletter of the
Int'l Commercial Arb. Comm., A.B.A. SEC. ON INT'L L. 1 (1993).
52. How much good such court-packing actually does parties in international arbitrations
can be debated. If both parties pack the court, the chairman effectively makes the decision.
Some argue that the appointment of advocate-arbitrators is often counter-productive. See
Craig, supra note 51, at 212. In this writer's view, that very much depends on how the advo-
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The appointment of advocate-arbitrators is not a trivial matter. First, it
reduces a panel's ability to function as a deliberative, as well as an adjudica-
tive, body. When party-appointed arbitrators act as advocates, deliberations
are replaced by a contest for the chairman's vote. Second, the parties re-
search the relevant views of arbitrators (if not before, then after they are
appointed) and thus know when their opponent has appointed someone who
is likely to prove unpersuadable on important issues. No doubt such circum-
stances can have an adverse effect on the willingness of parties to accept a
panel's decision, or possibly even to cooperate in the arbitration.
NAFTA's procedure for selecting arbitrators represents an effort to pro-
duce panels that will reflect a substantial level of agreement among the par-
ties. By forcing the parties to reach an agreement on the roster of possible
arbitrators before any particular dispute has arisen, and by leaving open the
possibility that any person on the roster might be named to a panel by any
party, the parties are given an incentive to select people for the roster pri-
marily because of their ability and fairness. Known views on particular
questions are of little importance at the outset of an agreement because the
subjects of any future disputes usually cannot be predicted with any particu-
larity 53 and, in any event, the members of the roster are selected by consen-
sus, thus giving the other members a veto over individuals with known
uncongenial views.54
The NAFTA procedure achieves the advantages just described while at
the same time avoiding the most serious danger presented by a permanent
tribunal: long-term hostility to the views of one party. While no party can
prevent another party from reappointing a particular arbitrator, any party
can ensure that a panel has at least two members who are different from the
members of the preceding panel. 55 The procedure thus consists of a cross
between appointing different arbitrators for each dispute from an essentially
unlimited pool, and referring all disputes to a permanent tribunal.
This hybrid method of selecting arbitrators distinguishes arbitration under
NAFTA, as well as the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, from arbitra-
tion in most other contexts. This is not to say that the NAFTA method
cate-arbitrator handles himself in the panel's deliberations. It also depends on whether both
parties are trying to appoint advocates.
53. It is doubtful that anyone would have predicted at the signing of the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement that the first two, intergovernmental disputes under that agree-
ment would involve Canadian landing requirements for Pacific coast salmon and herring and a
U.S. restriction on the size of lobsters that could be sold in this country. See supra note 44.
The subjects of trade disputes tend to be very specific and, thus, very unpredictable.
54. In this respect, as in many others, the NAFTA arbitrator-selection procedure follows
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, albeit with a difference in form. Article
1807 of the Canada-United States Agreement simply required that arbitrators (or "experts" as
they are denominated in that agreement) be chosen from the roster. Article 2011, Paragraph
3, of the NAFTA achieves the same result but by a more circuitous route. It states that
"[p]anelists shall normally be selected from the roster," but then goes on to give any disputing
party the right to "exercise a peremptory challenge" against any proposed arbitrator who is
not on the roster, so long as the challenge is made within fifteen days. The purpose served by
this peculiar provision is unclear, to say the least.
55. In addition, the chance that a biased arbitrator will appear on the roster is lowered by
the requirement that individuals listed on the roster be selected by consensus.
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should serve as a model in all other contexts. No doubt the parties to most
commercial contracts would not find it worth their trouble to name in ad-
vance several individuals who might serve as arbitrators in the event of a
dispute. 56 In many cases the parties probably would prefer to appoint arbi-
trators who, because of their views on important questions, will essentially
act as advocates within the arbitration panel. But there are likely other cir-
cumstances in which the parties to an agreement would value some advance
assurance that, should they need to resort to arbitration, the entire panel will
consist of people who all parties agree are able and fair. If the parties value
such advance assurances enough, they will find it worthwhile to try to agree
on a list of potential arbitrators, or on a sole arbitrator, before a concrete
dispute clouds their judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the primary considerations that underlie most international dis-
pute-resolution mechanisms are fundamentally different from those behind
most domestic ADR mechanisms, any comparisons of the two must be made
carefully. The most important consideration in the international context,
which is absent in the domestic context, is the need to equalize post-agree-
ment bargaining power with a strong dispute-settlement mechanism. Do-
mestically, this need can be met by the courts without any assistance from an
ADR mechanism.
In both the international and the domestic contexts, it is important to be
clear about the real differences between the various types of dispute-settle-
ment mechanisms available. In disputes between states, the greatest differ-
ence is between mediation and nonbinding arbitration, rather than between
binding and nonbinding arbitration, because the means of enforcing binding
and nonbinding decisions are essentially the same - retaliation. This differ-
ence does not carry as much weight in the domestic context, where the do-
mestic courts are available to enforce binding, but not nonbinding, decisions.
Similarly, in the international context, when the dispute is between private
parties of different nationalities, or even between a state and a private party
of a different nationality, awards, if binding, can be enforced in domestic
courts.57
The ways of selecting arbitrators can also be important. Indeed, it is in
this connection that NAFTA's dispute-resolution procedures may be most
worth studying. NAFTA's way of selecting arbitrators requires an amount
of time and attention from the parties that probably could not be justified in
most situations. The selection process does, however, offer a way out of the
advocate-arbitrator paradigm that parties so often feel compelled to follow.
56. Not only would it be difficult to agree on the initial list of potential arbitrators, but
also there would be the question of how long persons stayed on the list before coming up for
review. In the NAFTA, potential arbitrators remain on the roster for three years but may be
reappointed by consensus. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2009.
57. See New York Convention, supra note 35, at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40.
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